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PROTECTING CHILDREN? THE
EVOLUTION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT:
A HISTORICAL TIMELINE OF
CHILDREN AND THEIR ACCESS TO
PORNOGRAPHY AND VIOLENCE
Nicole DiGiose*
I.

Introduction

The United States Constitution states: “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . .”1 The Constitution ensures that the government will
not infringe upon certain rights, and perhaps one of the most
important rights that a person retains is their right to freedom
of speech. While the Constitution ensures that free speech will
not be violated, there are some exceptions that are not covered
by the First Amendment: obscenity,2 fighting words,3
incitement,4 and defamation,5 to name a few. However, when
children are involved, freedom of speech issues become unclear.
While adults are able to enjoy certain means of speech,
historically the Supreme Court has decided that children and
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Pace University School of Law. I would
like to thank my family and friends for their continued love and
support, especially my mother, Dale—without all of you, I
wouldn’t have made it to where I am today. I would also like to
thank Professor Bennett Gershman for sparking my interest in
constitutional law and his guidance and assistance with this
paper—without your help, I’m afraid this paper would still be
scribbles in a notebook!
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
3. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
4. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
5. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
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their innocence may not be protected, and their rights may be
closer to those that adults enjoy.6
This paper will explore the evolving relationship between
children and their access to potentially harmful materials. The
timeline will start at Part II.A with the landmark decision of
Prince v. Massachusetts,7 a 1940’s case, wherein children were
afforded the most constitutional protection.8 In Part II.B, this
paper will evaluate another landmark decision: Ginsberg v.
New York.9 In this 1968 case, the Supreme Court declared that
children shall not have access to harmful, pornographic
materials.10 By the 1990s, there appeared to be a notable shift
in how the Supreme Court decided cases pertaining to children
and their access to potentially harmful materials.11 Part III of
this paper will assess less stringent protections of children.
Particularly, Part III.A will review Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,12 a 1996 case
concerning children and their access to materials on cable
television.13 Additionally, in Part III.B, this paper will explore
children’s access to materials on the Internet in Reno v.
ACLU.14 In Part III.C, this paper will take an interesting look
at Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,15 a 2002 case exploring a
new technological development, virtual child pornography. In
Part IV.A, the timeline will come to an end with the recently
decided Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,16 wherein
the Supreme Court opted to allow children to have access to
violent video games, a 180 degree shift from the Ginsberg
decision regarding pornography, decided only forty-five years
earlier.

6. See generally Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
7. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
8. See discussion infra Part II.A.
9. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
10. See discussion infra Part II.B.
11. See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.B.
12. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
13. See discussion infra Part III.A.
14. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
15. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
16. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
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Finally, in Part IV.B, this paper will evaluate this timeline
of landmark Supreme Court decisions to determine if the
Supreme Court went too far with the Brown decision. In 2011,
the Court decided that children should have access to violent
video games, which may have potentially harmful effects,
rather than ensuring their innocence.17 In making this decision
the Court ignored new technological advances and potential
adverse effects these games may have on children’s
psychological and behavioral development. This paper will
address these issues and speculate as to what may happen in
the future.
II. Children Afforded the Most Constitutional Protection
A. Prince v. Massachusetts (1944)
The Prince case displays an important foundation laid by
the Court: protecting children is of the utmost importance.18
Although the case does not directly involve a child’s access to
harmful materials, it involves a child’s exposure to a dangerous
practice: child labor.19 Sarah Prince was attempting to exercise
her religious convictions by distributing Jehovah’s Witness
magazines.20 She was out with her nine-year-old niece, Betty,
who was attempting to help Prince with her sales.21 When
approached by a police officer trying to enforce a statute
prohibiting child labor, Prince refused to disclose Betty’s age
and identity.22 The statute prohibiting child labor read, “[n]o
boy under twelve and no girl under eighteen shall sell, expose
or offer for sale any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any
other articles of merchandise . . . in any street or public
place.”23 The statute went on to say, “[a]ny parent, guardian or
custodian having a minor under his control who compels or
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
2012)).

Id. at 2741.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
See generally id.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 160-61 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 69 (West
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permits such minor to work in violation of any provision . . .
shall for a first offence be punished . . . .”24 Prince claimed that
Betty was “exercising her God-given right and her
constitutional right to preach the gospel . . . .”25 Prince was
convicted of violating Massachusetts’s child labor laws, and
subsequently appealed.26
In his decision, Justice Rutledge acknowledged that
parents have a right to give their children “religious training
and to encourage them in the practice of religious belief . . . .”27
However, he went on to say, neither rights of religion nor
rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the
general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens
patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and in
many other ways.28 He continued to say “that the state has a
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and
authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and that this
includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious
conviction.”29 Finally, he stated, “the state’s authority over
children’s activities is broader than over like actions of
adults.”30
This decision set the stage for the later Supreme Court
decisions aimed at protecting children.31 Although this case
pertained to child labor, it nonetheless showed that the
government has the authority to limit certain rights in an
effort to protect the welfare of children.32 Furthermore, Prince
held that the state has a “wide range of power” to limit what
parents can and cannot do regarding their own children,
especially in regard to matters of “conscience and religious
conviction.”33 The words “wide range of power” in areas of
“conscience” and “religious conviction” imply that the Court is
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 161 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 81 (West 2012)).
Id. at 162.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
Id. at 167.
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willing to protect children even if it means restricting parents’
rights. The words “wide range of power,” especially, indicate
that it is within the Court’s authority to get involved in some
aspects of private life that will protect children, perhaps even
matters of pornography and violence, since such matters are
definitely encompassed in the phrase “conscience or religious
conviction.” The Court is ultimately saying that they can, and
will, do whatever possible to protect the well-being of children.
Although the Court attempts to limit their decision by stating,
“[o]ur ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case
presents,”34 numerous future courts have cited to this decision,
reiterating the overall tone of the decision,35 which implies one
of the Court’s priorities: protecting children even if it means
interfering with parenting decisions.36
B. Ginsberg v. New York (1968)
The Ginsberg case is perhaps one of the most important
cases to date pertaining to protecting children and their access
to harmful materials.37 It has been cited in over 750 cases and
as recently as December 4, 2012. In Ginsberg, the appellant
operated a stationary and luncheonette on Long Island, where
he sold lunch and magazines, including “girlie” magazines.38
Here, the so-called “girlie” magazines were those that
contained pictures which depicted female nudity, particularly
female buttocks or female breasts, with less than a full opaque
covering.39 The appellant was convicted of personally selling
two “girlie” magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy, on two
separate occasions in October 1965, in violation of Section 484h of the New York Penal Law.40 The lower court found that the
34. Id. at 171.
35. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d
531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
36. Prince, 321 U.S. at 171.
37. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629.
38. Id. at 631.
39. Id. at 632.
40. Id. at 631. The law in question in Ginsberg reads, in pertinent part:
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magazines contained pictures that depicted female “nudity”
and that the pictures were “harmful to minors,” but the
appellant appealed the conviction until it reached the Supreme
Court.41 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the New York law violated the appellant’s First
Amendment rights and affirmed the decision, holding that the
state had an “exigent interest in preventing the distribution to
children of objectionable material,”42 the statute did not invade
“the area of freedom of expression constitutionally guaranteed
to minors,”43 and the argument that the statute was void for
vagueness was wholly without merit.44

1. Definitions. As used in this section:
(a) ‘Minor’ means any person under the age of seventeen
years . . .
(f) ‘Harmful to minors’ means that quality of any description
or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse, when
it:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or
morbid interest of minors, and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable
material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for
minors . . . .
2. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or
loan for monetary consideration to a minor:
(a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion
picture film, or similar visual representation or image of a
person or portion of the human body which depicts nudity,
sexual conduct, or sadomasochistic abuse and which is
harmful to minors, or
(b) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however
reproduced, or sound recording which contains any matter
enumerated in paragraph (a) . . . or explicit and detailed
verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual
excitement, sexual conduct, or sado-masochistic abuse, and
which, taken as a whole is harmful to minors.
Id. at 645-47 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1965) (current
version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 2012)).
41. See id. at 631-33.
42. Id. at 636.
43. Id. at 637.
44. Id. at 645.
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The Court first noted that the “girlie” magazines involved
in this matter fit into the definition of obscenity, which “is not
within the area of protected speech or press.”45 Since
obscenities do not fall within First Amendment protections, the
Court is required to apply the more stringent strict scrutiny
standard.46 However, here the Court applied a lessor scrutiny
due to the fact that the case dealt with a prohibition on the sale
to minors of sexual material that would be considered obscene
for a child.47 The Court determined that the statute could be
sustained so long as the legislature’s judgment that the
proscribed materials were harmful to children “was not
irrational.”48 The Court reasoned that the well-being of
children was within the State’s constitutional power to regulate
since “it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors’
exposure to such material might be harmful.”49 Furthermore,
“[t]he State . . . has an independent interest in the well-being of
its youth.”50 The interest in protecting the well-being of our
nation’s youth was first recognized in Prince v. Massachusetts,
wherein the State “ha[d] an interest to protect the welfare of
children and to see that they are safeguarded from abuses
which might prevent their growth into free and independent
well-developed men and citizens.”51
In Ginsberg, the State showed that the law was
substantially related to the interest of protecting children with
legislative findings showing that the condemned material was
“a basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral development
of . . . youth . . . .”52 There was “no lack of studies [that]
purported to demonstrate” this idea.53 Although these studies
did not demonstrate a causal link, they did not disprove a

45. Id. at 635 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)).
46. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011).
47. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641-42.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 639.
50. Id. at 640.
51. Id. at 640-41 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165
(1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 641 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1965)
(current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 2012)).
53. Id.
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causal link either; this was sufficient for the Court.54 The Court
went on to emphasize that there is a difference between minors
and adults: adults may have constitutional rights to some
materials, but minors do not.55 Here, there was an “exigent
interest in preventing distribution to children of objectionable
material.”56 Once again, the Court stressed that protecting
children, particularly their well-being, development, and
morals, is more important than protecting their constitutional
right to access certain questionable and potentially harmful
materials. The Court again reiterated the holding of Prince:
“‘the power of the state to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.’”57 One of
the Court’s priorities was still to safeguard children from any
harm that could potentially damage their moral and/or ethical
development, even if adults could lawfully access the materials
in question.
III. Less Stringent Protection of Children
A.

Denver
Area
Educational
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC (1996)

Telecommunications

After the Court decided cases pertaining to child labor and
sexually explicit print materials, the 1990s saw cases decided
involving different mediums. In Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,58 the Supreme
Court decided whether the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, implemented by the
Federal
Communications
Commission
(“FCC”),
was
constitutional.59 The Act was originally challenged by various
54.
55.
56.
57.
(1944)).
58.
59.

Id. at 642.
Id. at 636.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170
518 U.S. 727 (1996).
Id.
[I]n an effort to control sexually explicit programming
conveyed over access channels, Congress enacted . . . three
provisions . . . . The first . . . “permit[ted] a cable operator to

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/10
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cable providers, who were victorious when a panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit found all three provisions of the Act unconstitutional.60
However, the Court of Appeals sitting en banc came to the
opposite conclusion, finding that the Act was constitutional.61
Justice Breyer opened his decision by stating, “[t]he
history of this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence . . . is
one of continual development . . . [and] has been applied to new
circumstances requiring different adaptations of prior
principles and precedents.”62 This statement indicates that the
1990s have brought different mediums to light and may need to
be addressed differently. He further stated that the tradition
embodies the Court’s dedication to protect speech from
regulation, “but without imposing . . . formulas so rigid that
they become a straitjacket that disables government from
responding to serious problems.”63 This is a noticeable
departure from the language of the previous two Supreme
Court decisions cited in this paper. While the Court must
protect constitutionally guaranteed rights, they may not do so
in an extreme nature. Finally, before addressing the specific
issue in Denver, Justice Breyer reiterated the Court’s power to
address extraordinary problems with “appropriately tailored”

. . . prohibit[] programming that the cable operator
reasonably believe[d] describe[d] or depict[ed] sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner
as measured by contemporary community standards.” The
second . . . require[d] cable operators to segregate and . . .
block similar programming if they decide[d] to permit . . . its
broadcast. . . . The third provision . . . “enable[d] . . . cable
operator[s] . . . to prohibit the use . . . of any channel
capacity of any public, educational, or governmental access
facility for any programming which contains obscene
material, sexually explicit conduct, or material soliciting or
promoting unlawful conduct.”
Id. at 734-36 (quoting Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992)).
60. Id. at 736 (citing Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812
(1993)).
61. Id. (citing Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105 (1995)).
62. Id. at 740.
63. Id. at 741.
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regulations.64 Citing Ginsberg, the Court stated that this case
dealt with an extremely important justification that the “Court
has often found compelling- the need to protect children from
exposure to patently offensive sex-related material.”65
The Court found that the first provision was
constitutionally permissible for various reasons: the need to
protect children, the fact that children have a wide range of
access to television broadcasting, and the permissive nature of
the restriction.66 Overall, the first restriction allowed operators
to reschedule programming, rather than implementing a
complete ban, while balancing the interests of protecting
children and protecting speech.67 The second and third
provisions, however, did not pass constitutional muster.68 The
second provision required a complete restriction on patently
offensive materials on leased channels.69 While the Court again
stated that protecting children is a “compelling interest,” they
found that the “segregate and block” requirement was not the
proper way to manage this interest.70 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court used a hybrid test resembling strict
scrutiny: whether the regulation was the “least restrictive
alternative” and whether it was “narrowly tailored” to meet its
objective.71 The Court held that the second provision was
“overly restrictive, ‘sacrific[ing]’ important First Amendment
interests for too ‘speculative a gain.’”72 Finally, the Court
looked at the third provision, one that was very similar to the
permissible first provision, but dealt with public access
channels. Historically, operators have not exercised editorial
control over these channels.73 Additionally, the Court pointed
out that there are supervising boards for these channels to
monitor what goes on the air, and there was no need to have
64. Id.
65. Id. at 743 (emphasis added) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 639-40 (1968)).
66. See id. at 743-46.
67. See id. at 747.
68. See id. at 753-66.
69. Id. at 753.
70. Id. at 755.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 760 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 761 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 30 (1984)).
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this provision.74 The government simply did not meet its
burden, which resembled strict scrutiny, to prove that the
provision “[was] necessary to protect children or that it [was]
appropriately tailored” to do so.75
This case represents somewhat of a middle ground in the
Court’s mindset toward protecting children’s innocence and
well-being via their access to potentially harmful materials,
versus protecting First Amendment rights. While the Court
explicitly pointed out, at least three separate times in the
decision,76 that children and their protection from harmful
materials represents a compelling governmental interest, it
still concluded that the regulations in Denver did not
appropriately balance the competing interests.77 Since the case
involved obscene materials, the hybrid test, which resembles
strict scrutiny, was appropriate.78 However, the regulations did
not meet the hybrid test.79 The laws simply did not regulate the
area narrowly enough, meaning that the children’s First
Amendment rights prevailed.80
B. Reno v. ACLU (1997)
The Internet has revolutionized the way our society works
by transforming the way we transmit data and information.
Instead of physically going to a store to purchase something,
consumers can do so in the comfort of their homes with the
simple click of their mouse. However, with such a wide-open
information network, it is almost inevitable that harmful
materials may end up on the Internet and in the hands of naive
children who should be shielded from access to these materials.
The first major Supreme Court ruling regarding materials
distributed over the Internet came in 1997, in Reno v. ACLU.81

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 762.
Id. at 766 (citations omitted).
See id. at 743, 747, 755.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 755.
Id.
Id. at 756.
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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The court started by noting that
[t]he Internet has experienced “extraordinary
growth.” The number of “host” computers—those
that
store
information
and
relay
communications—increased from about [three
hundred] in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by
the time of the trial in 1996. . . . About [forty]
million people used the Internet at the time of
trial, a number that [was] expected to mushroom
to [two hundred] million by 1999.”82
Users can take advantage of a wide variety of
communication techniques, the most relevant to the case being
e-mail, mail exploders, listservs, newsgroups, chat rooms, etc.83
“From the publishers’ point of view, [the Internet] constitutes a
vast platform from which to address and hear from a
worldwide audience of millions . . . .”84 The Internet also
provides a means to transmit obscene or sexually explicit
material.85 In order to protect children, various systems were
developed to help control the material available on a home
computer by blocking inappropriate sites, for example.86
Eventually, commercial pornographic cites popped up that
charged users for access as a means of age verification.87 In
1996, the Telecommunications Act was passed, which included
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), which
further included “the ‘indecent transmission’ provision and the
‘patently offensive display’ provision.”88 The CDA stated that it
was a crime to make, create, solicit, or initiate the transmission
of indecent or sexually explicit material to anyone under the
age of eighteen.89

82. Id. at 850 (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 851.
84. Id. at 853.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 854-55.
87. Id. at 856.
88. Id. at 859 (footnote omitted); see Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
89. Reno, 521 U.S. at 859-61 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2006)).
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The lower court entered a preliminary injunction against
the enforcement of the two challenged provisions, holding that
the statutes violated the First Amendment, because they were
overbroad, and the Fifth Amendment, because they were
vague.90 The government appealed, attempting to rely, in part,
on the Court’s decision in Ginsberg.91
However, the government was unsuccessful in its appeal
and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision,
enjoining the Act.92 Specifically, the Court pointed out
differences between the statute in Ginsberg and the CDA,
finding that the statute in Ginsberg was much narrower in four
important respects.93 “First, . . . in Ginsberg[,] ‘the prohibition
against sales to minors [did] not bar parents . . . from [buying]
the magazines for their children.’”94 On the other hand, under
the CDA, neither the parents’ consent nor their participation
could get around the statute.95 “Second, the New York statute
applied only to commercial transactions, whereas the CDA
contains no such limitation.”96 Third, the statutes differed on
their definitions pertaining to the material they forbade. The
New York statute stated that in order to be harmful to minors,
the material must be “utterly without redeeming social
importance for minors.”97 Meanwhile, the CDA “fail[ed] to
provide any definition of [the term] indecent.”98 Finally, New
York defined a minor as anyone under the age of seventeen,
while the CDA defined a minor as anyone under the age of
eighteen.99
These four differences help emphasize the notion that the
Court had become more meticulous about requirements to
block certain material. One regulation was able to pass
constitutional muster, while the other was found
unconstitutional. This can be attributed to the language of the
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 862-63.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 865.
Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646).
Id.
Id. at 865-66.
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regulations: the language of the regulation in Ginsberg was
both more meticulous and more specific. This suggests that the
Court requires a more specific and narrowly tailored
restriction, which the CDA did not possess. The Court
concluded that the CDA did not have the “precision that the
First Amendment requires” for content-based restrictions.100
The CDA suppressed a large amount of speech, which adults
have a constitutional right to enjoy, in order to deny minors
access to potentially harmful speech.101 This burden on speech
is impermissible if the legitimate purpose can be achieved by
less restrictive means.102 The Court appears to be prioritizing
rights over the protection and innocence of children, especially
when the material is suitable for adults. The Court goes on to
state that just because something is offensive does not mean
that it may be suppressed.103 The Court is now erring on the
side of preserving the free flow of ideas rather than censuring
and limiting access to them. Finally, the Court recognizes that
there is a strong governmental interest in protecting children
from harmful materials.104 However, this “interest does not
justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed
to adults.”105 “[T]he government may not ‘reduc[e] the adult
population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.’”106
“‘[R]egardless of the strength of the government’s interest in
protecting children, ‘[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox
simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a
sandbox.’”107 The Court’s language makes it evident that one of
its new priorities is to protect the rights of free speech and
expression rather than ensuring children develop morally and
ethically, as the Court once stated in Ginsberg.

100. Id. at 874.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 875 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978)).
104. Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. at 749).
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759 (1996)).
107. Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74
(1983)).
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C. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002)
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition discussed the situation
surrounding the Child Pornography Prevention Act
(“CPPA”).108 In 1996, the CPPA was passed.109 The Act
“extend[ed] the federal prohibition against child pornography
to sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors but
were produced without using any real children.”110 The Act
focused on virtual child pornography, which uses adults who
look like minors or computer images to simulate child
pornography.111 This new technology made it possible to create
realistic images of people and children who did not exist.112 At
the time the Free Speech Coalition challenged the statute,
there was a circuit split over whether the CPPA was
constitutional.113 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether the CPPA infringed upon First Amendment
Rights.114 The Court held that the CPPA was overbroad and
therefore, unconstitutional.115 Because teenage sexuality has
been a theme of art, movies, and literature in modern society,
the Court concluded that these images could not be considered
obscene, as any possessor of these items would be subject to
punishment.116 The Court also held that “[v]irtual child
pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of
children . . . .”117 Finally, the Court found that “[t]he mere
tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a
sufficient reason for banning it” and the argument that virtual
child pornography may encourage pedophiles to act unlawfully

108. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
109. Id. at 239.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 239-40.
112. Id. at 240.
113. See id. at 244.
114. Id.; see United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Acheson, 195
F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir.
1999).
115. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258.
116. Id. at 247-49.
117. Id. at 250.
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is unsustainable,118 absent a showing that the speech will incite
imminent lawless action.119
The Court reiterated what it has said in previous
decisions: “that speech within the rights of adults to hear may
not be silenced completely in an attempt to shield children from
it.”120 The Court went on to say that “[t]he government may not
prohibit speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act
will be committed ‘at some indefinite future time.’”121 “The
government may suppress speech for advocating the use of
force or a violation of law only if ‘such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.’”122 The Court did not find the
incitement outlined in Brandenburg in this case; rather, there
was only a remote connection between the virtual pornography
and the chance that pedophiles may act on it.123
The Court’s holding in Ashcroft, like its holding in Reno,
found that the CPPA did not meet the precise restriction
required by the First Amendment. Rather than upholding a
law blocking questionable materials, the Court preferred to
tread lightly and preserve the rights of its citizens. The Court
may be ignoring something very important—the fact that this
speech could really harm children and that perhaps more
narrowly drawn laws, rather than sweeping prohibitions, could
possibly pass constitutional muster.

118.
119.
120.
(1989)).
121.
curiam)).
122.
curiam)).
123.

Id. at 253.
Id.
Id. at 252 (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
Id. at 253 (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per
Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
See id. at 253-54.
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IV. Going Too Far? Children’s First Amendment Rights
Favored over Their Protection
A. Brown v. Entertainment Merchant’s Ass’n (2011)
This small selection of cases, dating from the 1940s to the
new millennium, shows a change in the Supreme Court’s
attitude, especially with the invention of new interfaces to
access information. Originally, one of the Court’s priorities was
to protect children and their purity.124 As the years passed, new
technology was discovered and used by the masses, society’s
values changed, and access to information became easier. This
influenced one of the Court’s new priorities: to ensure that
First Amendment rights are protected. Brown v. Entertainment
Merchant’s Ass’n, a recent Supreme Court decision, dealt with
the censuring of violent video games from minors in the state of
California.125 A California Act was passed that “prohibit[ed] the
sale or rental of ‘violent video games’ to minors, and require[d]
their packaging to be labeled ‘18.’”126 The Act applied to minors
under the age of eighteen,127 and defined video games as “any
electronic amusement device that utilizes a computer,
microprocessor, or similar electronic circuitry and its own
monitor, or is designed to be used with a television set or a
computer monitor, that interacts with the user of the device.”128
The Act prohibited violent video games in which:
the range of options available to a player
includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or
sexually assaulting an image of a human being,
if those acts are depicted in the game in a
manner that does either of the following:
(A) Comes within all of the following
descriptions:
(i) A reasonable person, considering the

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
Id. at 2732 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746-1746.5 (West 2009)).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(a) (West 2009).
Id. § 1746(c).
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game as a whole, would find appeals to a
deviant or morbid interest of minors
(ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the community as to what is
suitable for minors
(iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack
serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors.
(B) Enables the player to virtually inflict
serious injury upon images of human beings
or characters with substantially human
characteristics in a manner which is
especially heinous, cruel, or depraved in that
it involves torture or serious physical abuse
to the victim.129
The definitions of heinous, cruel, depraved, and torture
include things that are “shockingly atrocious” or involve “a high
degree of pain,” “physical abuse,” “substantial risk of death,”
“mental abuse,” etc.130 To determine if the violence depicted in
129. Id. § 1746(d)(1).
130. Id. § 1746(d)(2). The definitions read, in full:
(A) “Cruel” means that the player intends to virtually inflict
a high degree of pain by torture or serious physical abuse of
the victim in addition to killing the victim.
(B) “Depraved” means that the player relishes the virtual
killing or shows indifference to the suffering of the victim,
as evidenced by torture or serious physical abuse of the
victim.
(C) “Heinous” means shockingly atrocious. For the killing
depicted in a video game to be heinous, it must involve
additional acts of torture or serious physical abuse of the
victim as set apart from other killings.
(D) “Serious physical abuse” means a significant or
considerable amount of injury or damage to the victim's
body which involves a substantial risk of death,
unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, substantial
disfigurement, or substantial impairment of the function of
a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. Serious physical
abuse, unlike torture, does not require that the victim be
conscious of the abuse at the time it is inflicted. However,
the player must specifically intend the abuse apart from the
killing.
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the game was especially cruel, depraved, or heinous, factors to
be considered were the “infliction of gratuitous violence upon
the victim beyond that necessary to commit the killing,
needless mutilation of the victim’s body, and the helplessness
of the victim.”131
A pre-enforcement challenge was brought by video game
and software industries in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California.132 The District Court
“concluded that the Act violated the First Amendment and
permanently enjoined its enforcement.”133 On appeal, the
decision was affirmed.134 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine whether the ban of “violent video games” for
minors violated their First Amendment rights.135 The Court
affirmed the lower court’s decision, and held that video games
qualify for First Amendment protection,136 new categories of
unprotected speech may not be added,137 that “[b]ecause the
Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it
is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes
strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that
interest,”138 and that because California was unable to meet
that burden, the statute was unconstitutional.139

(E) “Torture” includes mental as well as physical abuse of
the victim. In either case, the virtual victim must be
conscious of the abuse at the time it is inflicted; and the
player must specifically intend to virtually inflict severe
mental or physical pain or suffering upon the victim, apart
from killing the victim.
Id.
131. § 1746(d)(3).
132. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
133. Id. (citing Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C05-04188 (RMW), 2007 WL 2261546 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007)).
134. Id. (citing Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556
F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2733.
137. Id. at 2734; see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577
(2010).
138. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 2739.
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B. Analysis of the Brown Decision
In its decision, the Court first “acknowledge[d] that video
games
qualify
for
First
Amendment
protection.”140
Furthermore, the Court determined that United States v.
Stevens,141 a case holding “that new categories of unprotected
speech may not be added to the list by a legislature that
concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated,” was
controlling in Brown.142 The Court in Stevens held that violent
speech regulations could not be made to look like obscenity
regulations.143 This is of particular importance because by
failing to either create a new category of unprotected speech or
categorize violence with obscenities, the Court determined that
the appropriate test was strict scrutiny.144 The strict scrutiny
standard of review requires “a compelling government interest
that is narrowly drawn to serve that interest,”145 as opposed to
the lesser scrutiny applied in Ginsberg, where minors and
unprotected speech (obscenities) were involved.146 This means
that violence is a protected form of speech, unlike obscenities,
which is why it receives the highest level of scrutiny.
Furthermore, “[t]he State must specifically identify an ‘actual
problem’ in need of solving,” and infringing on free speech must
be necessary to solve that problem.147 This standard is very
demanding, and the Court held that California did not meet
it.148 The State provided evidence that was not compelling, such
as “studies purporting to show a connection between exposure
to . . . video games and harmful effects,” but these studies were
rejected because they showed a correlation, rather than
showing that the games cause minors to act aggressively.149

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
(2000)).
149.

Id. at 2733.
130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
Id. (citing Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591).
See id. at 2738.
Id.
Id. at 2735 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1969)).
Id. at 2738.
Id. (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 818
Id. (citations omitted).
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In the present case, as well as in other attempts to
regulate violent video games, “[s]tates have commonly
advanced two [legitimate] rationales . . . : ‘preventing violent,
aggressive, and antisocial behavior; and preventing
psychological or neurological harm to minors who play . . . [the]
games.’”150 Unfortunately, “beyond mere recitation of a
compelling interest, the government bears the burden to
‘demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these
harms in a direct and material way.’”151 Again, unfortunately,
the courts almost always view the states’ scientific evidence
with great skepticism.152 It is interesting to note that just fortyfive years prior, the Court in Ginsberg actually embraced
studies that were less than conclusive in their proof of
causation.153 This inconsistency provides even more evidence
that values and priorities have shifted over a relatively short
period of time.
In order to further arguments that violent “video games
[should] fall under exceptions to the First Amendment’s
protections,” and thereby trigger a lesser degree of scrutiny,
various states have unsuccessfully attempted to argue “that
video games constitute [(1)] obscene speech, [(2)] speech that is
harmful to minors, and [(3)] speech that incites imminent
lawless action.”154
As stated above and reaffirmed by the Stevens case,
violence does not fall under the category of obscenity.155
Obscenity is defined as “works, which taken as a whole, appeal
to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in
a patently offensive way and . . . do not have serious literary,

150. James Dunkelberger, Comment, The New Resident Evil? State
Regulation of Violent Video Games and the First Amendment, 2011 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1659, 1665-66 (2011) (quoting Video Software Dealers Ass’n v.
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009)).
151. Id. at 1666 (quoting Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 962).
152. Id. at 1666-67.
153. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-42 (1968).
154. Gregory Kenyota, Note, Thinking of the Children: The Failure of
Violent Video Game Laws, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 785,
799-800 (2008).
155. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
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artistic, political, or scientific value.”156
In attempting to rely on the concept that video games are
harmful to minors, states have urged the Court to rely on the
decision in Ginsberg.157 Since the statue in Brown mirrors the
statute in Ginsberg, the Court in Brown evaluated why one was
successful and one was not.158 Ginsberg involved obscenities,
which are not protected by the First Amendment; therefore,
they could be regulated as long as the finding that they were
harmful to children was not irrational, thereby passing
intermediate scrutiny.159 Violent video games, on the other
hand, do not fall into an unprotected category and the Court in
Brown was unwilling to create one.160 Because “minors are
entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment
protection . . . only in relatively narrow and well-defined
circumstances may government bar public dissemination of
protected materials to them.”161 The Court acknowledges that a
state does possess “power to protect children from harm, but
[this] does not [extend to] . . . ideas to which children may be
exposed.”162 Rather than protecting children from these
potentially harmful ideas, the Court found that suppression of
these ideas would be more detrimental to others’ First
Amendment rights: “Speech that is neither obscene as to
youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot
be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images
that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”163
States have also attempted to argue that violent video
games incite imminent lawless action.164 This argument would
trigger the Brandenburg v. Ohio165 test, requiring the state to

156. Kenyota, supra note 154, at 800 (quoting Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
157. Id.
158. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011).
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 2735-36 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 212-13 (1975)).
162. Id. at 2736 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.629, 64041(1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)).
163. Id. (quoting Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213-14).
164. Kenyota, supra note 154, at 801.
165. 395 U.S. 568 (1942).
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show that “(1) playing video games somehow tells people to
commit violent acts and (2) video game players are likely to do
so. . . .”166 Unfortunately, as the majority points out, the studies
relied upon could not establish a solid causal link between
playing games and imminent violence.167 However, these
studies may still be in their infancy with room for further
development. In looking at this argument, it is important to
evaluate the video games themselves. For example, games such
as Grand Theft Auto IV encourage users to commit crimes,
such as burglary, robbery, assault, arson, murder, prostitution,
drug trafficking, as well as evading police in the process.168
Grand Theft Auto’s website even contains a “comedic” poll:
“Has GTA IV influenced you to commit crimes?”169 The options
that users can select from include: (1) “[n]ope, it’s just a game”;
(2) “[o]nly petty crimes”; (3) “[s]tealing has become a hobby”; (4)
“[y]es, can’t say more, cops are coming”; (5) “I am the living
incarnation of Niko” (the game’s main character).170 While
some gamers may find this poll comedic, it still points out that
some people could have the mentality to act upon what they
play out in these so called “harmless” games.
Perhaps even more shocking, life may have actually
imitated art (if video games can even be considered art) in
1999, with the occurrence of one of the most horrific tragedies
and deadliest school shootings in U.S. history.171 On April 20,
1999, two teenagers attending Columbine High School opened
fire and killed thirteen people and injured another twentyone.172 In a subsequent investigation of the tragedy, it was
revealed that the two teens were obsessed with the game
DOOM, wherein “players took the role of a marine trapped on
166. Kenyota, supra note 154, at 801.
167. See id. at 802.
168. See GRAND THEFT AUTO IV, http://www.gta4.net/overview/ (last
visited Jan. 7, 2013).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Kenyota, supra note 154, at 790-92.
172. James Brooke, Terror in Littleton: The Overview; 2 Students in
Colorado School Said to Gun Down as Many as 23 and Kill Themselves in a
Siege,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
21,
1999,
at
A16,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/21/us/terror-littleton-overview-2-studentscolorado-school-said-gun-down-many-23kill.html?ref=columbinehighschool&pagewanted=1.
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Mars that had to shoot and kill aliens in order to escape.”173
One of the teens responsible for Columbine even stated in a
video made before the shootings, “it’s going to be like fucking
Doom!”174 How videogames cannot be said to influence or even
incite players to reenact what they do in their realistic virtual
world is absurd— especially when there are specific examples
of these horrific virtual crimes playing out in reality, and not
only in virtual reality!
The Court in Brown, perhaps incorrectly, analogized video
games to protected books, plays, and movies, because they all
“communicate ideas—and even social messages.”175 The
majority then went on to compare various books throughout
history that have not been suppressed, yet contained gore,
citing literature such as Grimm’s Fairy Tales, Snow White,
Cinderella and Hansel and Gretel.176 However, the Court did
not seem to acknowledge nor take into account the difference
between reading a book and engaging in the interactive media
within video games.177 The Court even went so far as to say
that a book is just as interactive as a video game!178 However,
there are vast differences between the two. Books do not have
features such as virtual reality, uncanny graphics or motion
control which are standard in the newest, most technologicallyadvanced games.179 Instead, books require readers to take what
they have read and use their imagination to paint a picture in
their minds. Video games, on the other hand, paint these
pictures for users on the screens right in front of them.
Furthermore, it is important to note that video game
technology is still in its infancy. “New developments . . . allow
for far more graphic and realistic violent acts than ever
previously depicted . . . [and can apply] to almost every human
sense.”180 There are even visual enhancements that support
173. Kenyota, supra note 154, at 790.
174. Id. at 790-91.
175. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
176. See id. at 2736.
177. See id. at 2737-38.
178. See id. at 2738.
179. See Eric T. Gerson, Note, Video Game Violence and the Technology
of the Future, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1123-24 (2011).
180. Robert Bryan Norris, Jr., Note, It’s All Fun and Games Until
Someone Gets Hurt: Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association and the
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three-dimensional gaming,181 making it nearly impossible to
analogize this technology with a book, containing only written
words on paper. Games and systems such as Microsoft’s Kinect
completely eliminate the need for a controller, instead using a
camera and infrared lens to map a player’s actual body
movements in three dimensions, literally placing them in the
game.182 Additionally, this gaming system “allows for voice
commands and facial recognition technology,”183 again, much
more advanced than reading a book and drawing imagery with
one’s own imagination.
Another important effect of video games on their users is
the impact of experience. “Evidence of video games
psychological, emotional, and experiential impact can be found
in a virtual reality program called Virtual Iraq . . . .”184 This
game was used to treat soldiers suffering from Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).185 Published results from the
program show that eighty percent of those who completed the
program “showed . . . statistically and clinically meaningful
reductions in PTSD, anxiety, and depression.”186 This study
helps to illustrate how video games can trigger certain stimuli
in one’s brain. However, while this game and study were used
to treat soldiers, isn’t it possible that it would have opposite
effects on different users, especially those not under medical
supervision? The Federal Communications Committee
conducted a study in 2007, regarding the possible effects
violent programming can have on children.187 This study was
conducted at the “request [of] thirty-nine members of the U.S.
House of Representatives.”188 It found that there was deep
concern among both health professionals and parents, as to the
Problem of Interactivity, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 81, 85 (2011).
181. Id. at 86.
182. See id. at 87.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 102.
185. Id. at 102-03.
186. Id. at 103 (quoting Albert Rizzo et al., Development and Clinical
Results from the Virtual Iraq Exposure Therapy Application for PTSD, 1208
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 114, 122 (2010)).
187. In re Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children,
22 FCC Rcd. 7929 (2007).
188. Id. at 7930.
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effect violence on television may have on children.189 Overall, it
found “that exposure to violence in the media can increase
aggressive behavior in children, at least in the short term.”190
While this study only tapped into the surface of the issue,
perhaps the most important thing that it did was identify that
there really could be a problem, a problem that the Court opted
to ignore. Even though this study shows a possible effect
immediately after viewing violence on television, it still shows
an effect—one that must be investigated further to ensure that
there really are not any adverse long term effects on society’s
youth.
Although the statute in Brown was struck down, the
majority ends with this quote, perhaps leaving the door open
for the future: “California’s legislation straddles the fence
between (1) addressing a serious social problem and (2) helping
concerned parents control their children. Both ends are
legitimate, but when they affect First Amendment rights they
must be pursued by means that are neither seriously
underinclusive nor seriously overinclusive.”191 While the Court
acknowledges that the legislature may be on to something, it
again reiterates just how important constitutional guarantees
are, and is simply not prepared to infringe upon them solely for
the benefit of protecting children.
V. Conclusion—What’s Next?
The timeline of relevant Supreme Court cases evidences a
shift in the Court’s attitude throughout the years. At one point
in the past, one of the Court’s priorities was to ensure that
children were protected from certain harmful things and
materials to guarantee their moral and ethical development.
However, as time went on and with the invention of new
technologies such as the Internet and “virtual child
pornography,” the Court began to shift in its attitude, ensuring
that certain mediums and materials could not be restricted
solely because they could be harmful to children, especially

189. Id. at 7931.
190. Id.
191. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741-42 (2011).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/10

26

DIGIOSE FINAL

488

2/28/2013 11:52 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

when adults were free to enjoy these materials. Furthermore,
the Court was not willing to hold that materials may be
restricted if they could incite future lawless action. The Court
may have potentially erred in deciding the Brown case. It failed
to distinguish new technology from written materials that have
been around for thousands of years. It also failed to
acknowledge that these new materials might have an
extremely detrimental effect on our youth, such as severe
psychological effects or inciting copycat crimes, mimicking
what went on in a video game. Whatever the effects may be,
the Court simply does not acknowledge that children’s
innocence could be in jeopardy! When a child is playing a game
that instructs players to shoot and kill police, or rape and
maim women, society is saying that these behaviors are
acceptable.
Nevertheless, by 2011, the Court reaffirmed this shift in
values, holding that children’s right to access materials should
not be restricted based on the material’s violent nature without
a concrete showing of negative effects on the children. The
California law in Brown was struck down and considered a
constitutional victory, particularly for children. However, it is
important to note that the 7-2 decision in Brown may really be
closer to a 5-4 decision as the Chief Justice and Justice Alito’s
concurring opinions could almost be read as dissents. Both
Justices agreed that the law should have been struck down
because of overbreadth; this could mean that a revised and
more narrowly tailored restriction on video games could
succeed in the future.192 Furthermore, both the Chief Justice
and Justice Alito acknowledged that the technology in video
games is new, unknown, and could lead to a major social
problem in the future.
[T]he California statue is well intentioned . . . .
[T]his court should proceed with caution. We
should make every effort to understand . . . new
technology. We should take into account the
possibility that developing technology may have
important societal implications that will become
192. Id. at 2742-51 (Alito, J., concurring).
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apparent only with time. We should not jump to
the conclusion that new technology is
fundamentally the same as some older things
with which we are familiar.193
This warning from the two Justices makes the future seem
somewhat unsure. As to where the Court will go in the future
regarding children, censorship, and constitutional rights, only
time will tell; but if the Court continues to follow the pattern it
has over the past seventy years, it seems as though First
Amendment rights will continue to take precedent over the
protection of children’s innocence.

193. Id. at 2742.
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